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INTRODUCTION 
As the recognition of the right to reparation grows, so do the legal 
issues pertaining to its practical application. Certainly, in the realm 
of international human rights law, new cases offer opportunities to 
continue defining the parameters of this right, as noted in an ever-
growing jurisprudence with respect to remedies law.1 Some issues, 
due to their potential to generate new forms of harm and even new 
rights violations, beg further discussion and clarification.  Such is the 
case with the equity doctrine of “clean hands” (the “Clean Hands 
Doctrine”) which dictates that an injured party’s wrongdoing may 
limit his or her claim to reparations.2  However, this doctrine, when 
applied in cases where victims of human rights violations seek relief, 
conflicts directly with the well-established legal principle of non-
discrimination. 
This Article explores the applicability of the Cleans Hand 
Doctrine in human rights cases. In essence, this article questions 
whether a person’s innocence or guilt factors into whether he or she 
 
 1. See generally DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW 22-37 (2d ed. 2005) (highlighting cases from the European, Inter-
American, and African human rights systems and explaining how those bodies 
have applied the right to remedies in these cases). 
 2. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the doctrine as 
the “principle that a party cannot seek equitable relief or assert an equitable 
defense if that party has violated an equitable principle”). 
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deserves to be repaired. Moreover, this article explores what actions, 
allegiances and beliefs constitute a basis for exclusion, as well as 
what the standard is for determining wrongdoing—such as a firm 
criminal conviction or mere allegations.  This issue has particular 
salience in cases in which victims of human rights abuses are alleged 
to have connections to “subversive” and “terrorist” organizations 
(“illegally armed groups”). 
To explore these issues, this article begins with a general overview 
of reparations law, with specific analysis of its relevance to the 
transitional justice paradigm that produces administrative reparations 
plans.  It then explores the concept of the Clean Hands Doctrine in 
international law, and examines the existing, albeit limited and 
inconsistent, jurisprudence on the issue.  While consensus still does 
not exist on the doctrine’s applicability and relevance in international 
law, it is possible to argue that in relation to human rights law, the 
Clean Hands Doctrine does not, and should not, apply.  In support of 
this assertion, this article discusses the position assumed by the 
organs of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, including the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“Inter-American 
Commission”) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(“Inter-American Court”).3 While neither of these international 
human rights bodies has ruled directly on the issue, their decisions 
suggest that they do not consider the character or status of the victim 
as relevant factors in determining reparations.4  In effect, this reading 
supports the general rejection of the Clean Hands Doctrine in relation 
to reparations for human rights violations. 
Yet, in practice, nations confronting politically divisive transitions 
from repressive regimes and internal armed conflict do not 
necessarily assume this general rejection of the Clean Hands 
Doctrine. This Article illustrates this phenomenon through the case 
study of Peru, which after twenty years of internal armed conflict 
between the State and illegally armed groups, embarked on a 
transitional justice project by forming its Truth and Reconciliation 
 
 3. See Thomas Buergenthal, Centennial Essay, The Evolving International 
Human Rights System, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 783, 794-97 (2006) (describing the 
evolution of the Inter-American Human Rights System from a nascent system with 
no enforcement mechanism to its current system, which includes the Inter-
American Commission and the Inter-American Court). 
 4. See infra note 76. 
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Commission (“TRC”) in 2001.5 After two years of investigation, the 
TRC presented its Final Report in 2003, including recommendations 
for a Plan Integral de Reparaciones (Integral Plan of Reparations) 
(“PIR”), which adopts a partial rejection of the Clean Hands 
Doctrine.6 Yet, as the Peruvian government now attempts to 
implement the PIR, it confronts the controversial and divisive issues 
related to how it can, and must, approach victims of state abuse who 
allegedly have, or had, ties to illegally armed groups.7 Due to 
political pressure, the national legal norms codifying the PIR thus far 
contain exclusionary clauses that reflect a full adoption of the Clean 
Hands Doctrine. This policy has generated much tension in the 
implementation of the law.8 This Article discusses how this difficult 
context became more tense as a result of the recent decision of the 
Inter-American Court in Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru 
(“Castro Castro Prison”), in which it ordered reparations for 
survivors and the families of victims who were killed and harmed in 
1992 during a state lock down of a prison where they were being 
detained for terrorism. This Article concludes with a discussion of 
how the local tension produced by the practical repercussions of the 
Clean Hands Doctrine presents serious political challenges for 
emerging democracies attempting to build the rule of law and respect 
for human rights. 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO 
REPARATIONS 
The right to a remedy and reparations forms one of the pillars of 
international human rights law.9 Major human rights instruments, 
 
 5.  See Juan Forero, Peru Report Says 69,000 Died in 20 Years of Rebel War, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2003, at A3. 
 6. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Peru), Informe Final [Final 
Report], Plan Integral de Reparaciones [Integral Plan on Reparations], 
http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20IX/2.2.%20PIR.pdf [hereinafter 
PIR]. 
 7. See infra Part II.A–D. 
 8. See Ley Que Crea El Programa Integral de Reparaciones [Law Which 
Creates the Program on Integral Reparations], Law No. 28592, art. 4, July 29, 
2005, available at http://www.idl.org.pe/educa/PIR/28592.pdf [hereinafter PIR 
Law]. 
 9. See, e.g., Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
74, ¶¶ 3, 4, 135 (Feb. 6, 2001) (emphasizing the importance of an individual’s right 
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including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, recognize that 
when a state violates the human rights of a person under its 
jurisdiction, it assumes a new obligation to repair the harm caused by 
its wrongful act or omission.10 Yet, until now, there exists a relative 
paucity of academic writing and “sufficient systematic attention” to 
this legal principle.11 However, this trend is slowly changing in the 
process of strengthening and codifying international human rights 
norms. Certainly, international and national legal decisions, United 
Nations principles, academic commentary, and national experience 
all contribute to the increasing recognition of the right to reparations 
for victims of human rights violations. This process also helps define 
the acceptable standards and legal parameters for the application of 
this right. 
Most notably, the U.N. General Assembly approved in 2005 the 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Survivors of Violations of International Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law (“Basic Principles”), a framework 
predicated on a growing body of jurisprudence arising out of both 
treaty and customary law and which lays out specific legal contours 
of the right to reparations.12 Indeed, the Basic Principles specifically 
emphasize that they “do not entail new international or domestic 
 
to legal recourse under the Inter-American system and within democratic society, 
generally). 
 10. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 8, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200, art. 
3, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), G.A. Res. 2106, Annex, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965); 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 14, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 
51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 39, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
 11. See Pablo de Greiff, Introduction: Repairing the Past: Compensation for 
Victims of Human Rights Violations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 1, 3, 13 
(Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) (presenting case studies of different states that have 
implemented reparation programs and assessing the challenges that these states 
have faced). 
 12. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Survivors of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 
G.A. Res. 60/147, pmbl., Sec. IX, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006). 
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legal obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures 
and methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations 
under international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law which are complementary though different as to their norm.”13 
Despite the sudden novelty of reparations, the law of remedies 
certainly is a legal principle that dates back to antiquity.14 In effect, 
centuries of legal tradition view reparations as central to justice, 
embodying the fundamental maxim of law ubi ius, ibi remedium 
(where there is a right, there is a remedy).15 For example, Dinah 
Shelton writes, “the most common principle in all legal systems is 
that a wrongdoer has an obligation to make good the injury caused, 
reflecting the aim of compensatory justice.”16 Hence, most national 
jurisdictions contemplate some form of civil remedy, such as in 
contract and tort law, which establishes standards for “righting” 
wrongs between private parties.17 
Upon its inception, the human rights legal framework borrows 
these legal guidelines to inform its own evolving jurisprudence on 
reparations.18 Indeed, international tribunals have already contributed 
 
 13. See id. 
 14. See SHELTON, supra note 1, at 58-59 (characterizing the last 200 years of 
state jurisprudence on remedies as the precursor to the current body of 
international human rights law because those cases involved a state’s duty to 
protect an individual’s rights). 
 15. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Punishment, Redress, and Pardon: Theoretical 
and Psychological Approaches, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 13, 13-23 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) 
(giving an explanation of the different theories of punishment in the context of 
criminal justice and arguing that in the context of international human rights 
violations, the theories that are most appropriate are those focused on how the 
violations affected the victim and society as a whole). 
 16. See SHELTON, supra note 1, at 60. 
 17. See DONALD HARRIS, REMEDIES IN CONTRACT AND TORT 21-24, 338-42 
(2002) (providing an overview of contract and tort law, as well as the remedies that 
a party may receive in each type of case). When a party breaches a contract the 
available remedies are compensatory damages, restitution, exemplary damages, 
and literal enforcement, while in torts the remedies are usually only compensatory 
damages. Id. at 21, 338. 
 18. See Jo M. Pasqualucci, Victim Reparations in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System: A Critical Assessment of Current Practice and Procedure, 18 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 4-5 (1996) (explaining that human rights conventions often 
require ratifying states to remedy human rights violations by making reparations to 
the injured party when ordered to do so by a tribunal). 
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a substantial number of decisions setting important precedents for 
reparations in human rights cases. This can most readily be seen in 
the decisions issued by the Inter-American Court, which serves as 
the enforcement body of the American Convention on Human 
Rights.19 The jurisprudence developed in remedies law tends to be 
focused on individualized cases of measurable damages where 
restitution is not possible or practicable.20 Thus, the restitutio in 
integrum approach to reparations contemplates a variety of 
modalities to approximate “making a victim whole” and restoring the 
“status quo ante,” such as through restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.21 
A. REPARATIONS AS PART OF THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
PARADIGM 
Traditionally, reparations follow some form of legal proceeding, 
whether civil or criminal, that entails assessment of personal harm 
that the injured party (“the victim”) suffered in order to calculate 
damages.22 However, a recent trend indicates the development of 
administrative reparations plans in the aftermath of repressive 
 
 19. See Lisa J. Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home: The Inter-
American Human Rights System, Reparations, and the Duty of Prevention, 22 
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 347, 373 (2004) (asserting that victims of human rights 
violations have begun relying on the Inter-American Court to order states to pay 
reparations and arguing that if this trend continues, it could undermine the intended 
role of the Court as a body that compels states to adhere to the American 
Convention) [hereinafter Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home]; Dinah 
Shelton, Remedies in the Inter-American System, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
202, 203, 206 (1998) (explaining that although the Court has broad remedial 
powers that it often uses, there is still much development that needs to take place in 
the area of enforcement and implementation of ordered remedies). 
 20. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 157-58 (2004) (maintaining that although 
monetary reparations are recognized as a remedy for human rights violations, there 
are few instances where victims have actually received any money). 
 21. See G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 12, ¶¶ 19-23 (outlining the goals of 
restitution and compensation as remedies for human rights violations). 
 22. See Jaime E. Malamud-Goti & Lucas Sebastián Grosman, Reparations and 
Civil Litigation: Compensation for Human Rights Violations in Transitional 
Democracies, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 11, at 540 
(asserting that victims typically receive reparations either through the judicial 
system, where they may bring lawsuits against perpetrators, or through the 
administrative process, where victims are defined by a statute). 
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regimes or internal armed conflicts, especially those recommended 
by a TRC.23 Certainly, in situations of mass violence where many 
victims are left in a setting where existing judicial mechanisms 
typically failed to protect their fundamental rights to begin with, 
there is an obvious impracticality to resorting to the courts to resolve 
all of these reparations claims; thus, administrative plans may offer a 
more efficient and politically feasible option.24 
In these settings, “reparatory measures or reparations programs are 
integrated into wider social, political, and judicial reform processes, 
which together are intended to contribute to what is commonly 
termed ‘social reconstruction’ or ‘reconciliation.’”25 In this sense, 
reparations schemes provide a type of official acknowledgment of 
wrongdoing and in this “newer, more political incarnation, especially 
in transitional contexts,” they seek to heal individuals and social 
wounds.26 In effect, there is a growing international tendency to opt 
for an administrative reparations plan as part of a general transitional 
package that aims for broad societal reform and ultimately seeks to 
prevent future cycles of violence and human rights violations.27  In 
this new legal scheme, new challenges arise that require careful 
attention.  In particular, an urgent question exists with relation to the 
 
 23. See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE 
TERROR AND ATROCITY 171-82 (2001).  Often these commissions are in a good 
position to provide general recommendations for a reparations program because 
they have access to interviews with victims and other details about the atrocities 
that have taken place. Id. at 172. 
 24. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations in the Aftermath of Repression and 
Mass Violence, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY:  JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 121, 122, 127 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. 
Weinstein eds., 2004) (listing the different reparations programs that have been 
implemented in the past, but noting that in reality many victims never received the 
monetary reparations).  One reason for the discrepancy may be that, in poorer 
countries, reparations are not always economically feasible. Id. at 124. 
 25. M. Brinton Lykes & Marcie Mersky, Reparations and Mental Health:  
Psychosocial Interventions Towards Healing, Human Agency, and Rethreading 
Social Realities, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 11, at 590. 
 26. Id. at 590. 
 27. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 24, at 121 (highlighting some past reparations 
plans which include Germany compensating victims that suffered during the 
Holocaust and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
mandating that victims be allowed to pursue compensation through their domestic 
court system). 
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acceptable criteria and standards for determining who is a victim 
with a right to reparations in administrative reparations plans. 
B. THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
DISCRIMINATION: DETERMINING WHO IS A VICTIM 
Jurisprudence delineates a clear definition of who is considered a 
victim of human rights violations.28 Specifically, the Basic Principles 
consider victims to be “persons who individually or collectively 
suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional 
suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their 
fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross 
violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.”29 Dependents and the immediate 
family of the direct victim, as well as persons intervening on behalf 
of the victim, are included in this definition.30 
In addition, the Basic Principles include a non-discrimination 
clause which instructs that the application and interpretation of the 
Principles “must be consistent with international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law and be without any 
discrimination of any kind or on any ground, without exception.”31 
Likewise, Principle 3(c) indicates the duty to “provide those who 
claim to be victims of a human rights or humanitarian law violation 
with equal and effective access to justice... irrespective of who may 
ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation.”32 Here, 
the Basic Principles recognize that the determination and distribution 
of reparations cannot be based on discriminatory practices.33 While 
the Basic Principles do not enumerate the specific types of situations 
or acts that constitute discrimination, such typology can be inferred 
from known groups protected from discrimination in international, 
and most national, legal systems. These groups are usually defined 
 
 28. See G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 12, ¶ 8. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. ¶ 25. 
 32. Id. ¶ 3(c). 
 33. See id. ¶ 25 (noting that the application of the Basic Principles “must be 
consistent with international human rights law . . . and be without any 
discrimination of any kind or on any ground, without exception”). 
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by race, religion, gender, and ethnicity, among other classifications.34  
But what about discrimination based on guilt? That is, can 
reparations be denied to injured parties who are guilty of criminal 
wrongdoing, in particular wrongdoing associated with war or other 
acts of aggression, such as rebellion, terrorism and political 
violence? 
Here, the discussion must refer to the issue of “clean hands.” A 
general principle of equity recognizes that a person “who asks for 
redress must present himself with clean hands.”35 The Clean Hands 
Doctrine arises out of the concept of in parti delicto (of equal fault), 
which looks at the different levels of culpability of the parties to a 
dispute in order to determine fault and liability, such as in contract 
law, where an illegal or immoral agreement may serve as a defense 
to bar restitution.36 Metaphorically speaking, this protection assures 
that “no polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice.”37  
Thus, this common law principle seeks to balance blame in 
determining causation of injury and harm.38 
The concept of “clean hands” more frequently applies between 
equal parties, such as states.  For instance, Thomas Merrill discusses 
the basis for states’ claims for transboundary pollution in which a 
norm of reciprocity forms “a central element for identifying the 
appropriate equitable solution; specifically, they invoke the equitable 
maxim of ‘clean hands’—that one who seeks equity must do 
equity—as a justification for denying relief to states complaining of 
 
 34. See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 59 (2d ed. 1998) 
(arguing that treaty regimes based on racial discrimination, women’s rights, and 
children’s rights “give added international prominence to the rights they address”). 
 35. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 156 (1987). 
 36. See Steven L. Good & Celeste M. Hammond, Real Estate Auctions: Legal 
Concerns for an Increasingly Preferred Method of Selling Real Property, 40 REAL 
PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST J. 765, 793 (2006) (discussing the Michigan 
Supreme Court’s refusal to find a breach of a duty of care when it would have been 
created by a fraudulent contract). 
 37. See A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public Policy, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1445, 1445 n. 7 (2006). 
 38. See Aleksandr Shapovalov, Should a Requirement of “Clean Hands” Be a 
Prerequisite to the Exercise of Diplomatic Protection? Human Rights Implications 
of the International Law Commission’s Debate, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 830, 834-
35 (2005) (describing the consideration of the wrongful conduct of each party to an 
action as part of the merits of a claim). 
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pollution emanating from other states.”39 Similarly, the Clean Hands 
Doctrine has arisen in the area of diplomatic protection, prompting 
the United Nations International Law Commission (“ILC”) to seek 
views of governments on aspects of “the wrong action of a 
complainant.”40 
On the other hand, when a general public interest exists, the Clean 
Hands Doctrine may face certain limitations.41 One such example can 
be seen in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the antitrust suit 
Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. International Parts Corp.: 
There is nothing in the language of the antitrust Acts which 
indicates that Congress wanted to make the common-law in 
pari delicto doctrine a defense to treble-damage actions, and 
the facts of this case suggest no basis for applying such a 
doctrine even if it did exist. Although in pari delicto literally 
means “of equal fault,” the doctrine has been applied, 
correctly or incorrectly, in a wide variety of situations in 
which a plaintiff seeking damages or equitable relief is 
himself involved in some of the same sort of wrongdoing. We 
have often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking broad 
common law barriers to relief where a private suit serves 
important public purposes . . . .42 
The opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that overriding 
public interest may be invoked to limit what is historically a 
modality to mediate fairly between private parties.43 
Yet, debates held during the ILC’s drafting of the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts suggest that the 
applicability of the Clean Hands Doctrine in international law is not 
 
 39. Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE 
L.J. 931, 936 (1997). 
 40. Press Release, General Assembly, Legal Committee Is Told Draft Articles 
on Diplomatic Protection, U.N. Doc. GA/L/3263 (Nov. 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/gal3263.doc.htm. 
 41. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 
(1968) (refusing to apply the common law Clean Hands Doctrine where Congress 
has affirmatively legislated that plaintiffs harmed by anti-competitive practices 
may be entitled to damages). 
 42. Id. at 138 (emphasis added). 
 43. See id. at 139 (“The plaintiff who reaps the rewards of treble damages may 
be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages his suit 
to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition.”). 
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necessarily a settled matter.44 Article 31 establishes that “[t]he 
responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for 
the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”45 In 
establishing this liability standard, the document makes no mention 
of the Clean Hands Doctrine, although the ILC discussed the idea of 
“clean hands” at different points during the drafting of the articles.46 
For instance, in its 1999 deliberations of the draft articles, the ILC 
discussed the “so-called ‘clean hands’ doctrine” under the topic of 
“further justifications or excuses.”47 The Special Rapporteur James 
Crawford, appointed by the ILC in 1997, explained that “if it exist[s] 
at all,” the Clean Hands Doctrine relates to admissibility.48 Yet, ILC 
members disputed the Rapporteur’s assertion that the doctrine “was 
not yet part of general international law,” and instead asserted that it 
is “a basic principle of equity and justice.”49 In that vein, an ILC 
member suggested that to include the Clean Hands Doctrine would 
be consistent with the ILC’s purpose “to promote the progressive 
development of international law and its codification.”50 The ILC 
concluded that the Clean Hands Doctrine was “a principle of positive 
international law” but had an “impact on the scope of compensation” 
and not determinations of wrongfulness.51 Yet, the discussion 
concludes with Rapporteur Crawford noting that no delegate wanted 
the doctrine to be mentioned in the chapter on contributing fault, and 
instead would only be available in “connection with the loss of the 
right to invoke state responsibility.”52 
 
 44. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 51st 
Session, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 10, ¶ 411-14, U.N. Doc. A/54/10 
(1999) [hereinafter ILC 51st Session Report] (chronicling the debate over the 
applicability of the Clean Hands Doctrine to the law of state responsibility and its 
status as a “part of general international law”). 
 45. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 
56/83, art. 31, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Dec. 12, 
2001). 
 46. See ILC 51st Session Report, supra note 44, ¶¶ 411-415. 
 47. See id. § 48. 
 48. See id. ¶ 412. 
 49. See id. ¶ 413. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. ¶ 414. 
 52. See id. ¶ 415. 
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During its 2000 debates of the draft articles, the ILC returned to 
the topic of the Clean Hands Doctrine in the course of reviewing 
mitigating factors to state liability, particularly the text pertaining to 
“contribution to the injury.”53 One reading of this section suggests 
that the guidelines for finding degrees of liability, analogous to 
concepts of contributory fault or joint and several liability, are 
related to the “clean hands” concept.54 France’s delegate, Alain 
Pellet, opined about the apparent confusion as to whether Special 
Rapporteur Crawford intended the text to reflect a sort of Clean 
Hands Doctrine, although the Rapporteur clarified the previous year 
that he did not intend such a result.55 Pellet made note of the 
“extremely unclear” nature of the doctrine, and sought to clarify the 
debate by noting that even if the Rapporteur did not intend to invoke 
the concept of “clean hands” specifically, the general formula 
included this doctrine in the sense that “if a private individual had 
contributed to the damage, that contribution reduced the amount of 
the reparation.”56 He continued by clarifying that the issue at hand 
was a “mitigation of the reparation, not of responsibility . . . .”57 
Agreeing, Rapporteur Crawford responded that the draft articles 
“embodied a well-established principle, namely, that account could 
be taken of the conduct of a person on whose behalf a State was 
submitting a claim in determining the amount of reparation.”58 He 
conceded that this principle was associated at times with the Clean 
Hands Doctrine, but remarked that “whether that doctrine was 
autonomous in international law was open to question.”59 
 
 53. See Summary Record of the 2639th Meeting, [2000] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 210, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2639 (noting that the ILC specifically 
considered whether a State must take reasonable steps to minimize damages and 
whether the failure to do so could preclude recovery). 
 54. See id. (noting that contributory fault was “generally recognized as being 
relevant to the determination of reparation” because the concept was included in 
documents such as the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused 
by Space Objects). 
 55. See id. ¶ 48. (reporting that the concept of “clean hands” would be 
acceptable in some contexts, but not others). 
 56. Id. ¶ 51. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Summary Record of the 2640th Meeting, [2000] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 216, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2640. 
 59. Id. 
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Certainly, review of the ILC debates reflects the uncertainty of the 
legality and applicability of the Clean Hands Doctrine, at least in 
regard to state responsibility for wrongful actions.60 However, more 
recently in 2001, the ILC outright dismissed the Clean Hands 
Doctrine in its discussion of “circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness” found in Chapter V of the State Responsibility 
Articles.61 Its Annual Report explains that “[t]he so-called ‘clean 
hands’ doctrine has been invoked principally in the context of the 
admissibility of claims before international courts and tribunals, 
though rarely applied. It also does not need to be included here.”62 
Thus, despite disagreement on the status of the Clean Hands 
Doctrine in international law, the exclusion could be read to affirm 
that it is not necessarily a set legal principle. 
C. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
While uncertainty exists as to the general status of the Clean 
Hands Doctrine in international law, this doctrine should not apply in 
international human rights law given the very nature and purpose of 
these protections.63 Specifically, human rights guarantees specifically 
protect against as much state abuse and domination as against state 
negligence. Thus, a state’s failure to observe these international 
norms should result in remedying resulting harm regardless of the 
status of the victim.64 To this effect, Alex Tawanda Magaisa argues 
the following: 
 
 60. See id. (reporting that “the majority of the members of the Commission” 
favored the retention of a paragraph that superficially resembled the Clean Hands 
Doctrine after being assured that the paragraph did not actually contain the Clean 
Hands Doctrine). 
 61. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd 
Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Ch. V, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (1999). 
 62. See id. at Ch. V, ¶ 9. 
 63. See Summary Record of the 2639th Meeting, supra note 53, ¶ 48. 
 64. See Alex Tawanda Magaisa, “‘Clean Hands’? Thou Hath Blood on Your 
Hands”: A Critique of the Supreme Court Judgement in the ANZ Case, 1 INT’L J. 
CIV. SOC’Y L. 93 (2003) (asserting that the Clean Hands Doctrine is especially 
controversial when used to suggest that the State has no responsibility to uphold 
fundamental rights where a complainant has allegedly broken the laws of the 
State). 
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Even an accused who has confessed to committing an offence 
is still entitled to constitutional protection by the courts when 
he alleges that his constitutional rights have been violated. 
Prisoners who have committed offences against the state are 
still entitled to that protection despite having so-called 
“unclean hands” for disobeying the laws of the state . . . . 
There are other cases throughout the world where progressive 
courts have held that where the surrender of fundamental 
constitutional rights is concerned, the court’s inquiry cannot 
be limited to the “Clean Hands” of the complainant. The 
focus of constitutional rights protection is not on the guilt of 
the applicant but the constitutionality of laws or policies of 
the state.65 
In this way, Magaisa questions the applicability of this equity-
based doctrine in cases where fundamental legal rights are involved 
since it makes a mockery of the guarantees and protection of these 
rights, placing them at the “whims of the ruling party.”66 
Shelton, writing on reparations in international human rights law, 
explains that “[i]n general, the character of the victim should not be 
considered because it is irrelevant to the wrong and to the remedy, 
and implies a value judgment on the worth of an individual that has 
nothing to do with the injury suffered.”67 Yet, she discusses various 
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, primarily related 
to arbitrary and wrongful detentions and abusive conditions of 
confinement, in which applicants convicted of crimes were denied 
reparations, although the Court issued a declaratory judgment in their 
favor.68 Shelton’s analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
approach to what she terms “the ‘bad man’ basis for denying 
compensation” suggests that where a claimant is guilty of 
wrongdoing, he or she may be denied reparations whether or not his 
or her conduct directly caused the injury.69 
 
 65. Id. at 94-95. 
 66. See id. at 93-94 (noting that the Zimbabwean Supreme Court’s ruling 
implies that citizens must first comply with a law that may violate fundamental 
constitutional rights before they may challenge the law). 
 67. Shelton, supra note 1, at 119. 
 68. See id. at 209-11 (discussing two court opinions implying that the 
government may violate the rights of defendants who have committed a wrong). 
 69. See id. at 210. 
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Interpretation of this standard could read that but for the wrongful 
conduct of the person, he or she would not be subject to state control 
and thus would not have suffered harm.  Alternatively, a person who 
commits a wrong loses the protections enjoyed by “non-
delinquents,” creating a two-class tier of rights holders.70 Given that 
the overarching purpose of human rights protection is to curb state 
abuse, one could argue that carving out exceptions where human 
rights violations have no consequences presents a worrisome 
precedent.71 
On the contrary, decisions and commentaries of the organs of the 
Inter-American system suggest an opposite approach with regard to 
the Clean Hands Doctrine.72 For instance, in Martorell v. Chile, the 
Inter-American Commission refers to the preliminary exceptions 
hearing held in Fairén-Garbi v. Honduras on June 16, 1987 before 
the Inter-American Court.73 In recounting the experience, the Inter-
American Commission explains that during the Fairén-Garbi 
hearing, Judge Rigoberto Espinal Irias asked if there could be “‘any 
possible relationship or tie between the violation of human rights and 
the so-called Clean Hands Theory, well known in international 
law.’”74 At that time, the Inter-American Commission responded 
with the following explanation: 
The answer is obviously no. The Commission protects human 
beings, irrespective of their ideology or their behavior. 
Certain rights are inherent to every person, the right to life 
being the most important of all. Regardless of ideology, 
 
 70. See id. at 211 (illustrating support from the European Convention on the 
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes for denying compensation to victims 
based on their misconduct). 
 71. See Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home, supra note 19, at 367-71 
(explaining the need of the Inter-American Court to enforce reparation damages in 
Peru in order to combat human rights violations by the Peruvian government). 
 72. See Fairén-Garbi v. Honduras, 1994 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. D) No. 2, ¶ 90 
(June 26, 1987) (pointing out the obligation of States to guarantee rights 
recognized by the American Convention on Human Rights to all persons); 
Martorell v. Chile, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 11/96, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 65 (1997) (emphasizing that all persons have full 
protection of their rights guaranteed under the American Convention on Human 
Rights). 
 73. Martorell, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 11/96, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 78 n.6.  
 74. Id. 
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behavior or nature, if a person does not have “clean hands” it 
is of course the state’s duty to conduct a regular proceeding 
against that person. But under no circumstances does that 
mean that a country can execute the person, and certainly not 
by such a perverse method as forced disappearance. That is 
entirely unacceptable. There are no first and second-class 
citizens in diplomatic protection, Your Honor. The 
Commission has never asked about a person’s ideology or 
“why?” Never. And it never will.75 
Similarly, while the Inter-American Court has never explicitly 
referred to the Clean Hands Doctrine, it has never called into 
question the guilt or innocence of petitioners when deciding a 
reparations claims; in fact, it has ordered reparations in cases where 
the guilt of the victim remained unclear.76 For instance, in Neira-
Alegría v. Peru, the government argued against moral reparations for 
relatives of prisoners convicted of terrorism who had disappeared 
when the state’s armed forces attempted to squelch a massacre in the 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. The Inter-American Court has ordered reparations, including 
compensation, in cases where the victims had been convicted of guerrilla and 
subversive activities. See Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 91, ¶¶ 62-65 (Feb. 22, 2002) (stating that the family of a victim 
who was captured and disappeared during an armed battle between the Guatemalan 
army and the guerrilla movement deserved a full reparations award). In other cases 
where the victim had alleged subversive ties, the Inter-American Court did not 
initiate inquiry into their innocence or guilt, and instead addressed only the 
conduct of the state and whether it amounts to a human rights violation. See, e.g., 
Neira Alegría v. Peru, 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 29, ¶ 5 (Sept. 19, 
1996) (holding Peru liable for human rights violations against alleged terrorists); 
Castillo-Páez v. Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43, ¶ 3 (Nov. 27, 1998) 
(awarding reparations without addressing conduct of victim); Loayza-Tamayo v. 
Peru, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 47, ¶ 11 (Mar. 8, 1998) (granting 
compensation and ordering release of imprisoned victim); Castillo-Petruzzi v. 
Peru, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, ¶ 223 (May 30, 1999) (ordering 
payment of court costs for families of victims accused of treason); Benavides-
Ceballos v. Ecuador, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 38, ¶ 48 (June 19, 1998) 
(awarding reparations to the parents of a human-rights victim based on violations 
of the Ecuadorian government); Durand & Ugarte v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 89, ¶ 2 (Dec. 3, 2001) (declaring that Peru must compensate for human 
rights violations); Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, 2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 69, ¶ 198 (Aug. 18, 2000) (finding state violations against a victim who had 
been accused of treason); Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 75, ¶ 51 (May 14, 2001) (finding human rights violations against members of 
an alleged terrorist group). 
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Peruvian prison El Fronton on June 18, 1986.77 In its defense, the 
State argued, “the next of kin had already suffered moral damages, 
but . . . the damages had been inflicted on them by the victims 
themselves when they unlawfully took part in acts connected with 
terrorism, which was the reason for their arrest and untimely 
deaths.”78 However, the Inter-American Court rejected this argument, 
awarding moral damages to the family of the victims.79 Thus, taken 
as a whole, the jurisprudence emanating from the Inter-American 
system of human rights can be read to reject the Clean Hands 
Doctrine in reference to international human rights reparations law.80 
Yet, in practice, as discussed below, states seeking to implement 
reparations, even those pursuant to the Inter-American Court’s 
orders, confront political realities that threaten true fidelity to the 
legal principle that human rights violations automatically confer full 
entitlement to reparations.81 
 
II. THE PERUVIAN NATIONAL REPARATION 
SCHEME EXCLUDES DIRTY HANDS 
Without explicit and clear limits to the Clean Hands Doctrine in 
international human rights law, new types of violations of 
fundamental rights may arise through state policy and practices that 
discriminate among beneficiaries of reparations programs created in 
response to systematic and widespread human rights violations. This 
situation can be seen most poignantly in a country emerging from a 
politically divisive context, such as a civil war or internal armed 
conflict—for example, where the state defeated an illegally armed 
 
 77. See Neira-Alegría v. Peru, 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 29, ¶ 21 
(noting that the government deemed the suggested amount of moral damages 
“exorbitant”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. ¶ 58 (granting an indemnity of $20,000.00 to each of the families of 
the deceased and to each of the survivors). 
 80. See, e.g., Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 91, ¶ 106; Neira-Alegría v. Peru, 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 29, 
¶ 5; Castillo-Páez v. Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43, ¶ 3. 
 81. See Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home, supra note 19, at 369 
(asserting that “victim compensation for unlawful acts of the State can no longer 
be left to political discretion, but rather is a legal duty”). 
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group and subsequently restricted the group’s participation in peace 
negotiations which likely included provisions for their protection. 
Without negotiated protections, these former combatants rely on the 
good will of the state to observe existing international protections 
found in treaties and customary law.82 However, given that in 
practice, the full observance of these norms remains a distant ideal, 
the entitlement to reparations for those who suffer from wrongful 
state actions has become, de facto, a conditional right. Indeed, the 
criteria of innocence and guilt—even when not proven with judicial 
certainty—becomes a political, non-legal basis for determining who 
deserves reparations, and as a consequence, who enjoys full 
protection of their basic human rights. This result can be seen in the 
national reparations policy adopted by Peru as part of its overall 
political transition. 
A. THE PERUVIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
Peru formed its TRC in 2001 to investigate the causes, 
consequences and responsibilities of its bloody and prolonged war 
between the guerrilla Communist party group Sendero Luminoso (or 
“Shining Path”), the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 
(“MRTA”), the armed peasant patrols, and the Peruvian armed 
forces.83  Initially, Shining Path sparked its violent campaign against 
the state in the remote rural highlands of the country, beginning what 
quickly degenerated into a vicious reign of terror.84  At first, the 
governmental response included a brutal counter-insurgency war led 
 
 82. See Fairén-Garbi v. Honduras, 1994 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. D) No. 2, ¶ 90 
(demonstrating the international protections for all persons who are victims of 
human rights violations regardless of the actions of the victims). 
 83. See Supreme Decree of Peru, No. 065-2001-PCM, art. 2(a), available at 
http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/lacomision/ cnormas/normas01.php (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2007) (creating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate 
human rights violations in Peru from May 1980 to November 2000). 
 84. See CARLOS IVAN DEGREGORI, AYACHUCHO 1969-1979: EL SURGIMIENTO 
DE SENDERO LUMINOSO: DEL MOVIMIENTO POR LA GRATUIDAD DE LA ENSEÑANZA 
AL INICIO DE LA LUCHA ARMADA [THE EMERGENCE OF THE SHINING PATH:  ON 
THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS GRATITUDE FOR THE TEACHINGS OF THE BEGINNING OF 
THE ARMED STRUGGLE] 17 (1990); Carlos Ivan Degregori, The Origins and Logic 
of Shining Path, in THE SHINING PATH OF PERU 51, 51-52 (David Scott Palmer ed., 
1992) (describing the creation of Shining Path by Abimael Guzman Reynoso after 
his expulsion from the Peruvian Communist Party). 
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by the military, which often confused “Andean peasants” with 
“terrorists,” resulting in indiscriminate killing of this population.85  
As administrations changed, so did the tactics for fighting the enemy.  
The highest number of disappearances and extrajudicial killings were 
associated with the government of Alan Garcia in the 1980s; while 
the increased incidence of unlawful detention and torture took place 
under draconian anti-terrorism laws, instituted by the government of 
Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s.86 
Indeed, Fujimori’s authoritarian control continued even after the 
government imprisoned the majority of leaders from the illegally 
armed groups in 1992 and largely defeated the guerrilla movement.87  
A highly questioned presidential campaign led to Fujimori’s third re-
election, but soon after, he fled the country after a series of 
corruption scandals forced him to resign.88 During this significant 
political opening, the interim government of Valentín Paniagua 
established the TRC by executive decree.89 The TRC concluded its 
two-year investigation in August 2003, at which time it presented its 
Final Report based on almost 17,000 private and public testimonies 
as well as secondary sources.90 It estimated that approximately 
 
 85. See Deborah Poole & Gerardo Rénique, Terror and the Privatized State: A 
Peruvian Parable, 85 RADICAL HIST. REV. 150, 153 (2003) (explaining that the 
government justified rounding up Andean bystanders because they were “natural” 
allies of Sendero Luminoso). 
 86. See Hortensia Munoz, Human Rights and Social Referents: The 
Construction of New Sensibilities, in SHINING AND OTHER PATHS: WAR AND 
SOCIETY IN PERU, 1980-1995, at 447, 451-53 (Steve J. Stern ed., 1998) (giving 
account of a notoriously violent suppression of a prison uprising under Garcia’s 
leadership); Enrique Obando, Civil-Military Relations in Peru, 1980-1996: How to 
Control and Co-opt the Military (And The Consequences of Doing Do), in SHINING 
AND OTHER PATHS: WAR AND SOCIETY IN PERU, 1980-1995, at 385, 402 (Steve J. 
Stern ed., 1998) (explaining that Fujimori would not investigate human rights 
violations connected to attempts to eliminate alleged terrorists). 
 87. See Poole & Rénique, supra note 85, at 157 (describing how Fujimori 
expanded executive power and used military force in his “war against terrorism”). 
 88. See Roger Atwood, Democratic Dictators: Authoritarian Politics in Peru 
from Leguía to Fujimori, 21 SAIS REV. 155, 161, 171 (2001) (explaining that 
Peruvians thought of Fujimori as a dictator and forced him to resign after he was 
accused of bribery and illegal arms trafficking). 
 89. See Supreme Decree of Peru art. 1, supra note 83. 
 90. See Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Peru), Final Report, available 
at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php [hereinafter TRC 
Final Report]; Press Release, TRC Final Report Was Made Public on August 28th 
at Noon (August 2003), available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/informacion 
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69,280 people had been killed during the war, making it one of the 
country’s most deadly conflicts.91 In the section of the Final Report 
addressing the issue of accountability, the TRC held the Sendero 
Luminoso responsible for fifty-four percent of the deaths reported to 
the TRC and the armed forces for thirty-six percent.92  The TRC also 
found that the casualties ran along class and race lines, with three-
quarters of the victims belonging to the poor, rural and indigenous 
population.93 Indifference on the part of the powerful elite residing in 
urban centers contributed to the unabated violence, due to a long 
historical tradition of marginalization of the victim population.94 
As a partial response to its findings, the TRC designed the PIR and 
assigned it multiple purposes, including a comprehensive response to 
the serious individual and community harm caused by the war as 
well as an affirmation of the dignity and status of the victims.95 In 
effect, the PIR formed a central part of the TRC’s proposed plan for 
national recovery, sustainable peace and reconciliation, promising to 
contribute to “democratic consolidation, the return of faith in the 
future and to lay the foundation of a new social pact.”96 In its 
introduction, the PIR presents the ethical, political, psychological 
and juridical justifications for its proposals, linking reparations to the 
prevention of violence and the promotion of national reconciliation.97 
As a consequence of these ambitious aims, the PIR contains five 
components that include symbolic reparations (for example, public 
gestures, acts of recognition, memorials, etc.), reparations in the form 
of services like health and education, restitution of citizen rights, 
individualized economic reparations, and collective, community-
wide reparations.98 It also includes definitions of victims and 
beneficiaries that are among the most inclusive to date, including 
victims of forced disappearances, kidnapping, extrajudicial killing, 
 
/nprensa/notas.php?idnota=171. 
 91. See TRC Final Report, supra note 90, ¶ 2. 
 92. See id. ¶ 13. 
 93. See id. ¶¶ 6-7 (observing that “the process of violence, combined with 
socioeconomic gaps, highlighted the seriousness of ethno-cultural inequalities that 
still prevail in the country”). 
 94. See id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
 95. PIR, supra note 6, at 147-48. 
 96. See id. at 139 [translation by author]. 
 97. See id. at 139-43. 
 98. See id. at 159-205. 
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assassinations, forced displacement, arbitrary detention without due 
process, forced recruitment, torture, rape and people wounded, 
injured and killed in acts against international humanitarian law.99 
The families of these victims are also considered beneficiaries of the 
PIR.100 However, despite the inclusive nature of the PIR due to 
TRC’s intent to include all foreseeable victims, the PIR struggled 
with the treatment of one group: members of illegally armed groups 
and their families.101 
B. THE TRUTH COMMISSION STRUGGLES WITH THE CLEAN HANDS 
DOCTRINE 
The Grupo sobre el Plan Integral de Reparaciones (Integral 
Reparations Plan Group) (“GPIR”), responsible for designing the 
PIR, specifically contemplated the concept of “clean hands” during 
its drafting of the PIR, and presented the issue to the TRC 
commissioners for debate.102 This discussion was prompted in part by 
a Working Paper entitled “Parámetros para el Diseño de un 
Programa de Reparaciones en el Perú” (Parameters for the Design 
of a Reparations Program in Peru) and produced by the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (“ICTJ”) in New York and the 
Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos of Peru (“APRODEH”).103  In 
 
 99. See id. at 149 (noting the TRC’s effort to include recent doctrinal 
developments in international human rights). 
 100. See PIR, supra note 6, at 150. 
 101. See id. at 149-50 (affirming, on the one hand, that all victims of human 
rights violations deserve reparations regardless of the legality or morality of their 
personal actions, and yet asserting on the other that since members of subversive 
terrorist organizations rose against a democratic regime they were not  to be 
considered victims). 
 102. See JULIE GUILLEROT & LISA MAGARRELL, REPARACIONES EN LA 
TRANSICIÓN PERUANA: MEMORIAS DE UN PROCESO INACABADO [REPARATIONS IN 
THE PERUVIAN TRANSITION: REPORTS OF AN UNFINISHED PROCESS] 30, 142-43 
(2006) [hereinafter GUILLEROT & MAGARRELL] (explaining that the TRC formed 
the GPIR specifically to examine the recommendations for a comprehensive plan 
for reparations). 
 103. See CENTRO INTERNACIONAL PARA LA JUSTICIA TRANSICIONAL & 
ASOCIACIÓN PRO DERECHOS HUMANOS, PARÁMETROS PARA EL DISEÑO DE UN 
PROGRAMA DE REPARACIONES EN EL PERÚ [INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE PRO HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, PARAMETERS 
FOR THE DESIGN OF A REPARATIONS PROGRAM IN PERU] 1, 15 (Working Paper, 
2002) [hereinafter WORKING PAPER] (asking the TRC, the Peruvian Government, 
and civil society to debate the various issues described in the working paper, 
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setting forth the “minimum criteria” for reparations programs and 
referring to international experiences and standards, the 
ICTJ/APRODEH Working Paper explains: 
The program must satisfy the principles of non-
discrimination and equality. The principle of non-
discrimination prohibits prejudicial distinctions in the 
definition of categories of beneficiaries or the manner of 
reparation.  The principle of equality requires treating similar 
cases with equality. In relation to these principles, 
international law has clearly disbanded with the notion that in 
order to receive reparations, victims of human rights 
violations or international humanitarian law need to have 
“clean hands.”104 
In a later section entitled “Concept of Victims,” the 
ICTJ/APRODEH Working Paper goes into further discussion on the 
limits of the Clean Hands Doctrine.105  It sets the human rights 
violation as the point of departure, regardless of the relationship 
between the victim and author of the violation.106  It also argues that 
the definition of victim must leave out any allusion to the “previous 
conduct” of the injured person, and then asks: 
What effect does the “clean hands” concept have in relation 
to reparations? Supposing a victim of a human rights 
violation had belonged to an illegally armed group, or had 
participated in subversive activities or was a member of the 
military who became a victim of a violation of humanitarian 
law while at the same time committing abuses in the name of 
the State, how does this conduct affect the state’s duty to 
repair?107 
 
including the “clean hands” doctrine); GUILLEROT & MAGARRELL, supra note 102, 
at 30 (noting that the TRC used the working paper as a reference point when 
making recommendations for reparations). 
 104. See WORKING PAPER, supra note 103, at Executive Summary 3 [translation 
by author] (noting that a successful reparations program should provide monetary 
compensation for individuals and be compatible with other methods of transitional 
justice, such as truth-seeking and governmental reform). 
 105. See id. at 15-16 nn.17-19 (listing several Inter-American Court decisions 
illustrating that the character or conduct of the victim is irrelevant to an order of 
reparations). 
 106. See id. at 15. 
 107. See id. at 15 n.17 [translation by author] (defining the Clean Hands 
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The ICTJ/APRODEH Working Paper answers its own 
interrogatory by explaining how relevant norms and practice dictate 
that the illegality or immorality of a person’s conduct does not annul 
his or her entitlement to reparations, due in part to the non-
discrimination principle that forms one of the principal pillars of 
human rights and humanitarian law.108 The authors rely principally 
on the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
observing that “the Court has never suspended or modified its 
[reparations] determination based on the status or conduct of the 
victim. At the moment of determining whether the victims has the 
right to be repaired or not, the Court limits itself to evaluating the 
State’s conduct and its consequences for the affected person.”109 
Julie Guillerot, who was a co-author of the Working Paper and 
later an integrant of the GPIR, and Lisa Magarell, a senior associate 
with the ICTJ who also was a co-author and consultant to the GPIR, 
discuss the TRC’s dilemma in their book recounting their 
experience.110 Guillerot and Magarell indicate that the ethical, 
political and legal ramifications that the TRC faced during their 
“intense discussion” of the exclusion of illegally armed groups 
amounted to one of the only major issues in the development of a 
reparations plan.111 Some TRC commissioners demonstrated great 
reluctance to include “subversives” whose “horrendous crimes” were 
not considered justified given that they were carried out against a 
legitimate democratic regime.112 Moreover, other commissioners 
realized that the inclusion of members of illegally armed groups 
 
Doctrine as a concept which renders a victim’s prior conduct a factor to his or her 
rights). This factor is irrelevant in the context of human rights because they belong 
to every human being to the same degree. Id. 
 108. See id. at 15 n.18 (defining the non-discrimination principle, concerning 
reparations, as the application of international human rights norms without any 
prejudice to race, gender, ethnicity, language, ideology, religion, economic class, 
or other categories). 
 109. See id. at 15-16. 
 110. See GUILLEROT & MAGARRELL, supra note 102, at 142. 
 111. See id. (discussing at length how the issue of the exclusion of certain 
victims from the PIR led to intense discussion and complex efforts to reconcile the 
conceptually acceptable with the politically acceptable). 
 112. See id. (contrasting the differing approaches of the TRC Commissioners 
concerning reparations for subversives and reparations for members of the Armed 
Forces and the National Police, though these groups had committed comparable 
numbers of human rights violations). 
LAPLANTE WITH AUTHOR CHANGES.DOC 1/9/2008  6:38:36 PM 
2007] THE LAW OF REMEDIES AND THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE 75 
could “sink” the whole reparation project if rejected by public 
opinion.113  As products of their country’s own culture, history and 
politics, the commissioners’ concern reflected great savvy in what 
really amounted to a political project: guaranteeing that their final 
recommendations would be implemented and that political 
opposition could not disrupt the country’s delicate transition to peace 
and reconciliation. 
C. RECONCILING THE POLITICAL WITH THE LEGAL: 
CONTRADICTORY APPROACH TO THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE 
The final text of the PIR simultaneously reflects the influence of 
the ICTJ/APRODEH lobbying efforts to disband the Clean Hands 
Doctrine and reveals the political tension between absolute legal 
considerations and political realities.114 In principle, the TRC adopts 
the idea that identity of a perpetrator, and his or her relation to the 
victim, does not matter in the determination of reparations.115  
Specifically, it presents a definition of the “victim of the violation” 
that does not depend on the previous conduct of the injured person, 
using verbatim text from the ICTJ/APRODEH Working Paper on the 
principles of non-discrimination and equality before the law.116 The 
TRC notes that “the Peruvian practice, as much through the adoption 
of national norms as through the fulfillment of reparation judgments 
and friendly settlements with international organs, affirms that all 
people who suffered a violation of their human rights can be repaired 
without considering the legality or morality of their personal 
actions.”117 
Yet, in the next paragraph, the TRC notes: 
Considering the nature of the violence in Peru, . . . those 
people who were harmed, wounded or killed during armed 
confrontations and belonged in those moments to terrorist, 
 
 113. See id. 
 114. PIR, supra note 6, at 149-50 (rejecting the notion that victims must have 
“clean hands” and advocating the principle of non-discrimination). This view, 
however, only applied to those victim-perpetrators who suffered while fighting for 
the Peruvian government such as members of armed forces or police and not to 
members of subversive organizations. 
 115. See id. at 149. 
 116. See id. [translation by author]. 
 117. Id. at 149-50 [translation by author]. 
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subversive groups cannot be considered victims. These 
people took up arms against the democratic regime and thus 
faced legitimate and legal repression dictated through the 
norms of the State.118 
The TRC then distinguishes that members of the Armed Forces, 
police, and self-defense committees who were harmed, wounded or 
killed during armed confrontations “will be considered victims in 
this scheme. These people were harmed as a consequence of the legal 
and legitimate act of defending the democratic order and deserve 
recognition and respect from the State and Society.”119  It thus carves 
out a questionable distinction for members of the armed forces who, 
although complying with their official duties and being wounded or 
killed during acts of official service, would be treated as victims 
deserving reparations (as opposed to pensions, or compensation of 
other kind, for duty served).120  Here, the TRC added to an already 
existing tension in Peru in which “victims of terrorism” (the armed 
forces) have more rights, recognition and protections than “victims 
of the state” (populations often labeled as terrorists).121 
Yet, the TRC’s text leaves ambiguous whether members of 
subversive groups under other circumstances could be considered 
victims, and thus beneficiaries of the PIR.122  On that point exactly, 
the text of the PIR reiterates the previously stated exclusion, 
although with a small but significant change: it excludes members of 
subversive organizations who were wounded or killed “as a direct 
result of armed confrontation, unless the affectation resulted in a 
violation of their human rights.”123 Thus, in the end, the PIR, in a 
somewhat circuitous manner, concedes to the elimination of the 
Clean Hands Doctrine.124 Additionally, it also includes what amounts 
 
 118. See id. at 150 [translation by author]. 
 119. See id. [translation by author]. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See GUILLEROT & MAGARRELL, supra note 102, at 124, 145-46 
(chronicling the Peruvian Congressional debate on the exclusion of victims of 
violence who were involved in subversive activity, and describing, in part, the 
politcal atmosphere at the time of that debate). 
 122. See PIR, supra note 6, at 153. 
 123. Id. [translation by author] (emphasis added). 
 124. See GUILLEROT & MAGARRELL, supra note 102, at 145-46 (describing how 
the tension surrounding, and sensitivity called for by, these issues led to much 
LAPLANTE WITH AUTHOR CHANGES.DOC 1/9/2008  6:38:36 PM 
2007] THE LAW OF REMEDIES AND THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE 77 
to a “safety valve” of sorts, adding that “victims who are not 
included in the PIR and who can claim their right to reparations 
reserve their right to resort to the courts.”125 
The resulting compromises that favor the armed forces, even if 
they committed human rights abuses, at the exclusion of illegally 
armed groups that suffered human rights abuses at the hands of state 
agents, amounts to what Guillerot and Magarrell view as “an 
uncomfortable text that reveals the tension between a more pure 
vision of human rights and one that encapsulates the moral rejection 
of one sector of victims, that is one between the juridically correct 
and the politically ‘acceptable’ according to the TRC given the 
Peruvian context.”126 
D. THE PERUVIAN LAW OF REPARATIONS: ADOPTING THE CLEAN 
HANDS DOCTRINE 
Even though the TRC published its Final Report and 
recommendations in August 2003 with the hope that the Executive 
Office would immediately implement it, in reality civil society and 
victims-survivors have carried the burden of exerting pressure on the 
government to implement these suggestions.127 Finally, after much 
lobbying and debate, the Peruvian Congress enacted a law 
implementing the PIR on July 29, 2005. The PIR objective is to 
“establish the normative framework for the Plan Integral de 
Reparaciones - PIR for victims of the violence that occurred between 
May 1980 and November 2000, in conformity with the conclusions 
 
complex analysis within the TRC). 
 125. PIR, supra note 6, at 153 [translation by author]; see also GUILLEROT & 
MAGARRELL, supra note 102, at 145-46 (discussing, in part, the political 
atmosphere that led to these inclusions). 
 126. See GUILLEROT & MAGARRELL, supra note 102, at 144 [translation by 
author]. 
 127. See Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Truth with Consequences: 
Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 228, 
241-42 (2007) [hereinafter Laplante & Theidon, Truth with Consequences] 
(describing the grassroots, victims-survivors movement that has been necessary to 
pressure the government into implementing the TRC’s recommendations). In 
South Africa, follow-up measures to the TRC were slow to follow its work, 
causing delays in awarding reparations and thus causing victim frustration. 
Furthermore, certain communities in Peru have rejected the TRC because of its 
failure to meet its promises. 
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and recommendations of the Final Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.”128 While the law incorporated the 
majority of the PIR’s recommendations, it created one controversial 
article of exclusion. Specifically, article 4 of the law reads, 
“members of subversive organizations are not considered victims and 
thus not beneficiaries of the programs enumerated in this law.”129 
With respect to this exclusion, former Peruvian Congresswoman 
Gloria Helfer conceded that one of the most hotly contested issues 
during congressional debate on the law revolved around the 
resistance to “paying terrorists.” Helfer herself had to contemplate 
what political concessions were necessary in the effort to make sure 
the bill did not die.130 Moreover, she admitted that defending the 
rights of all victims, including those associated with subversive 
groups, meant running the risk of herself being called a terrorist.131  
Indeed, the societal fear of being labeled a terrorist, and thus being 
ostracized and even imprisoned, arose out of actual historical 
circumstances fomented by Peruvian laws that created the crime of 
“apology for terrorism” in the 1990s.132  Even the TRC’s twelve 
commissioners faced threats of prosecution for this “crime” in 2003 
when they included videos of leaders of the Sendero Luminoso and 
MRTA as part of a general public hearing on perpetrators.133 
 
 128. See PIR Law art. 1, supra note 8 [translation by author]. 
 129. Id. art. 4. 
 130. See Lisa J. Laplante, Heeding Peru’s Lesson: Paying Reparations to 
Detainees of Anti-Terrorism Laws, 2 HUM. RTS. COMMENT. 88, 96-97 (2006) 
[hereinafter Laplante, Heeding Peru’s Lesson] (observing that “Peruvian society is 
still deeply traumati[z]ed by the years of terrorism” and that because of this, “a 
program of reparations that could include compensation, and possibly release, for 
all people subject to the anti-terrorism laws is politically unpalatable”). 
 131. See id. at 96 (noting that opponents of the TRC attempted to undermine its 
authority and legitimacy by declaring that the Commission would release 
imprisoned terrorists and would “encourage a relapse of terrorism”). 
 132. See Jim Davis, A Cautionary Tale: Examining the Use of Military 
Tribunals by the United States in the Aftermath of the September 11 Attacks in 
Light of Peru’s History of Human Rights Abuses Resulting from Similar Measures, 
31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 427-31 (2003) (discussing the specific details of 
the Peruvian anti-terrorism legislation). 
 133. See Human Rights Watch, Peru-Truth Commission Under Pressure, Aug. 
12, 2003, available at http://hrw.org/press /2003/08/peru081203.htm (last visited 
July 31, 2007) (noting that a legislator who supported Fujimori filed the complaint 
with the Peruvian prosecutor). 
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Here, Guillerot and Magarrell point out that the strong opposition 
against an inclusive law emanated principally from members of 
Congress from the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria American 
(“APRA”) political party, whose leader Alan Garcia was president 
from 1985-1990 and himself faced charges for human rights 
violations.134  One of the most notable legislative debates revolved 
around the use of the term “victims of the internal armed conflict,” 
which included victims of both state agents and illegally armed 
groups; Garcia instead ardently defended that the term “victims of 
terrorism” applied only to victims of the “terrorist groups.”135  
Guillerot and Magarrell term this stance as “eminently auto-
protectionist,” given that the TRC implicated the APRA government 
in the 1980s in the internal armed conflict.136 
While the passage of the law was met with celebration since it at 
least represented a positive step toward reparations for the majority 
of victims, the law also created new tension due to its glaring 
exclusion.137 The implementation of the PIR now requires 
mechanisms for classifying “some people who do not deserve their 
rights,” which amounts to not recognizing them as human, while also 
permitting governments to continue justifying abusive and violating 
acts.138  In this way, the pending assignment facing Peruvian society 
relates to determining who is a “deserving victim” and who is not.139  
Having now established the Consejo de Reparaciones (“Council of 
 
 134. See GUILLEROT & MAGARRELL, supra note 102, at 146 n.54 (characterizing 
the Garcia administration’s position as one of self-preservation). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id.; see also TRC Final Report, supra note 90, ¶¶ 89-97 (detailing the 
actions of the APRA under the leadership of Alan Garcia). The TRC concluded 
that during this time “the armed forces acted with greater autonomy in their 
counter-subversive actions, without either the Executive or the Legislative branch 
providing them with a legal framework to do so.” Id. ¶ 92. 
 137. See Ronald Gamarra, Human Rights, Justice and Democratic Transition:  
Institutional Review, in THE LEGACY OF TRUTH—CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE 
PERUVIAN TRANSITION 69, 74 (Lisa Magarrell & Leonardo Filippini eds., 
Catherine Jagoe trans., 2006) (discussing how the PIR advances the cause of non-
monetary reparations, but also does not go far enough concerning monetary 
reparations). 
 138. See GUILLEROT & MAGARRELL, supra note 102, at 147-48 [translation by 
author]. 
 139. See id. (commenting that the designation “members of subversive 
organizations” is both overinclusive and underinclusive). 
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Reparations”), charged with creating the Registro Unico (The 
Registry) of victims, the State must set about identifying and 
certifying victims, a process that includes screening out those with 
alleged ties to illegally armed groups.140 Yet as an administrative 
body, the Council of Reparations does not have the facilities, nor can 
it count on the resources, to carry out the type of judicial proceedings 
that guarantee full due process.141 Thus, it faces the daunting task of 
devising a protocol that will permit such a determination.142 
Significantly, the Council of Reparations cannot necessarily rely 
on previous determinations of who is, and is not, a person who has, 
or had, subversive ties.143 Indeed, both national and international 
courts have found Peru’s anti-terrorism laws unconstitutional and 
contrary to fundamental human rights norms, putting into question 
the thousands of convictions declared under its provisions.144 For 
instance, the overbroad definition of terrorism prescribed by the laws 
led to many arrests and convictions for non-violent acts, at times 
meting out punishments based only on a person’s ideology or for 
uncorroborated, circumstantial accusations of membership to 
terrorist groups.145 Thus, in 1996, the same Fujimori government that 
created this legal regime began to release hundreds of people 
convicted of terrorism through a special process that determined their 
innocence.146 
 
 140. See PIR Law, supra note 9, art. 9 (establishing the Registro Unico). 
 141. See Gamarra, supra note 137, at 79-80 (suggesting that the Peruvian 
domestic court system cannot handle the heavy caseload of human rights violation 
claims). 
 142. See id. at 74 (outlining the goals to be met in implementing the PIR law, 
including “setting up the Council for Reparations properly”). 
 143. See Laplante, Heeding Peru’s Lesson, supra note 130, at 88-89 (providing 
an example of an individual who was charged with, and acquitted of, being a part 
of Sendero Luminoso in 1986, and arrested and convicted of the same crime in 
1997 based on the same evidence that led to his previous acquittal). 
 144. See Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home, supra note 19, at 367-71 
(providing an overview of the various decisions against the law); Laplante, 
Heeding Peru’s Lesson, supra  note 130, at 92-95; see also Davis, supra note 132, 
at 432-33 (outlining the various international bodies that have issued statements 
condemning Peru’s human rights abuses under the anti-terrorism legislation). 
 145. See Laplante, Heeding Peru’s Lesson, supra note 130, at 93-94 (stating that 
the crimes of apology and association with terrorists gave the government broad 
reach to incarcerate people as, for example, when a Peruvian boy was imprisoned 
for unknowingly providing food to members of Sendero Luminoso). 
 146. See Davis, supra note 132, at 431-32 (noting that Fujimori created a 
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Of equal significance, it is important to consider how this 
registration process will impact local communities where the brunt of 
the political violence occurred. Harvard anthropologist Kimberly 
Theidon has written on local, micro-reconciliation processes used by 
these communities to reintegrate former members of illegally armed 
groups, resulting in a functioning, albeit delicate, equilibrium and co-
existence.147 Yet, what will happen to this achievement of local peace 
when state registrars begin to enter and inquire into who deserves 
reparations? What type of instability, turmoil and new conflict will it 
introduce? Worrisome is the risk of false accusations that could 
preclude people from reparation benefits, leading to more tension—a 
possibility that becomes more real when considering that under 
Fujimori’s terrorism laws many people spent years in jail based on 
false accusations, sometimes made on the basis of personal vendettas 
alone.148 
The Council of Reparations’ members include two human rights 
activists, one indigenous leader, two retired generals, a retired 
policeman and a businessman.149  One of the retired generals, Danilo 
Guevara, expressed during a public conference held soon after the 
formation of the Council of Reparations that “it would be offensive if 
[members of] Sendero Luminoso were repaired,” adding that the PIR 
would only benefit the innocent.150 After the conference, a member 
 
commission to address the issue of people unjustly imprisoned under the anti-
terrorism legislation). 
 147. See Kimberly Theidon, Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics of 
Reconciliation in Postwar Peru, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 433, 456 (2006) 
(“My research with communities in Ayacucho prompts me to assert that ‘national 
reconciliation’ is several steps behind the transitional justice that campesinos have 
elaborated and practiced in the face of the daily challenges of social life and 
governance at the local level where intimate enemies must live side by side.”). 
 148. See Laplante, Heeding Peru’s Lesson, supra note 130, at 91 (noting that 
Fujimori’s anti-terrorism laws removed important due process protections, 
allowing people to be convicted based on the uncorroborated accusations of 
others). 
 149. See RPP Noticias, Del Castillo: Estoy Contento con Nominación de 
Macher en Consejo de Reparaciones [Del Castillo: I Am Happy with the 
Nomination of Macher to the Reparations Counsel], Oct. 23, 2006, 
http://www.rpp.com.pe/portada/politica/53134_1.php. 
 150. See Danilo Guevara, Remarks at Coloquio Internacional: Las Reparaciones 
a las Víctimas de la Violencia en Colombia y Peru: Retos y Perspectivas 
[Reparations to Victims of Violence in Colombia and Peru: Challenges and 
Perspectives] (Dec. 5-6, 2006) (notes on file with author). 
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of the Council of Reparations with a human rights background said 
that she sensed that Guevara and his colleagues were named to the 
council to guarantee stringent exclusion of any person suspected of 
subversive activity, thus paralyzing the process through a contentious 
and continuous battle on who is, and is not, a “subversive.”151 With 
the stigma of the war still fresh, and victims often suspected of 
allegiance with terrorist groups, the subjectivity of this process 
causes great concern.152 
Peru’s dilemma leaves left unanswered one important question: 
What will those excluded from the PIR do to demand their right to 
reparation if excluded? Here, one must consider that the PIR law, 
like the TRC’s proposed plan, contemplates a legal escape hatch that 
could, in the end, create a worse political situation than would have 
existed had illegally armed groups been included in the PIR’s 
administrative plan.153  Specifically, article 4 of the PIR law, which 
excludes “subversives,” concludes that “[v]ictims who are not 
included in the PIR and claim to have a right to reparations retain the 
right to resort to the judicial venue.”154 Certainly, this clause allows 
the government to escape accusations of altogether denying legal 
recourse to victims, thus outright violating international human rights 
law.155 Indeed, a state representative directly responsible for the 
implementation of the PIR assumed this very position during an 
interview.156 In responding to questions on the exclusion clause, he 
explained that the clause left open the judicial venue for victims 
excluded by virtue of their alleged links to subversion; he added that 
 
 151. Author’s personal conversation with Council of Reparations member, 
Lima, Peru (Dec. 6, 2006). 
 152. See Laplante, Heeding Peru’s Lesson, supra note 130, at 96 (observing that 
opponents of the TRC accused it of pardoning imprisoned “terrorists”). 
 153. See Laplante & Theidon, Truth with Consequences, supra note 127, at 248 
(noting that providing for reparations can be essential to meeting victims’ 
expectations of justice and to preventing violence from returning). 
 154. See PIR Law, supra note 8, art. 4 [translation by author]. 
 155. See Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home, supra note 19, at 362-63 
(discussing the ways in which the Peruvian government has attempted to comply 
with its international legal obligations but noting that, “Peru provides a case study 
of a nation which has suddenly begun to demonstrate increased cooperation with 
the orders of the Inter-American Court, but continues to fail in guaranteeing 
effective remedies at home”). 
 156. Interview with Public Functionary (Dec. 18, 2006) (notes on file with 
author). 
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the excluded victims may eventually resort to the Inter-American 
Commission and Inter-American Court, if necessary.157 In the self-
assured manner of offering this solution, he appeared to not have 
fully contemplated the political earthquake that would result if his 
suggestion were actually followed. Certainly, if it seemed politically 
impossible to justify relatively modest administrative reparations for 
members of illegally armed groups, how would the public react to 
such individuals’ ability to receive more generous reparations 
packages, including monetary indemnification amounting to 
thousands of dollars issued by the Inter-American Court?158  
Ironically, around the same time that this Peruvian official offered 
this technical solution, the Inter-American Court actually issued its 
judgment in favor of Peruvians suspected, and in some cases 
convicted, of terrorism and detained in the Peruvian Castro Castro 
Prison—a decision that has resulted in the polemic situation 
predicted above.159 
 
E. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT’S DECISION IN CASTRO CASTRO 
PRISON: CHALLENGES TO PERU’S NATIONAL REPARATION POLICY 
In the midst of Peru’s growing political dilemma over the 
exclusion of subversives from the PIR, the Inter-American Court 
tested Peru’s attempt to reconcile its exclusive reparations policy 
with its legal international obligations.160 Specifically, in Castro 
 
 157. See Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home, supra note 19, at 367 
(stating that the “Liberated Innocents,” who were imprisoned under the anti-
terrorism laws and later vindicated, resorted to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights to seek redress of their claims after realizing that domestic remedies would 
be ineffective). 
 158. See Laplante, Heeding Peru’s Lesson, supra note 130, at 96-97 (explaining 
that the Human Rights Committee viewed Peru’s anti-terrorism legislation as 
giving rise to a right to a remedy regardless of the culpability of the victim, 
whereas the TRC saw this as politically untenable); see also Lisa J. Laplante, 
Entwined Paths to Justice: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the 
Peruvian Truth Commission, in PATHS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (Marie Dembour & Tobias Kelly eds., 2007) [hereinafter 
Laplante, Entwined Paths to Justice]. 
 159. See Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 160, ¶ 470 (Nov. 25, 2006) (ordering the Peruvian government to pay 
reparations to the victims of human rights abuses at the Castro Castro Prison). 
 160. See id. ¶ 415 (“The obligation to repair, regulated in all its aspects . . . by 
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Castro Prison, the court ruled in favor of reparations for survivors 
and families of prisoners killed during a state-led massacre meant to 
quell an uprising of inmates detained on charges of, and in some 
cases convicted of, the crime of terrorism.161 
The court based its decisions on evidence that the State violated 
the fundamental human rights to life and physical and mental 
integrity.162  Specifically, on May 6, 1992, state forces carried out 
“Operativo Mudanza 1” (Operation Move 1) to suppress an alleged 
prison uprising led by people detained for terrorism, which lasted 
four days, although evidence indicates that the prisoners desisted 
from their rebellion shortly after the arrival of the state agents.163 The 
prison massacre resulted in the death of 42 inmates, injury to 175, 
and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of some 322 others.164 
Forensic evidence and testimony of survivors revealed that the 
mortality arose out of execution-like killings.165 
In the hearings on the merits, Peru assumed partial responsibility. 
This was due in part to then-President Alejandro Toledo’s general 
effort to promote the political transition and thus comply with 
international human rights obligations in the spirit of the TRC’s 
findings which included the Castro Castro Prison case.166 Yet, 
despite its partial acceptance of responsibility, the State presented the 
argument that the acts of violence were directed toward two prison 
barracks “occupied... by inmates accused of crimes of terrorism 
linked to Peru’s communist party Sendero Luminoso” and that the 
 
International Law, may not be modified or ignored by the State obliged, by 
invoking stipulations of its domestic law.”). 
 161. See id. ¶ 210 (explaining that state officials carried out the “operative” that 
was the subject of this case against inmates convicted of terrorism). 
 162. See id. ¶ 197(15)-(59) (detailing the human rights abuses committed by 
state officials in carrying out the “operative” to transfer inmates from the Castro 
Castro Prison to other prisons). 
 163. See id. ¶ 197(33)-(37) (stating that on May 8-9, 1992, the inmates tried to 
negotiate with state officials but failed). Some inmates later tried to surrender by 
exiting the prison unarmed but were gunned down by state agents. 
 164. See id. ¶ 3. 
 165. See id. ¶ 243 (concluding that “the shots fired by the police agents did not 
seek to immobilize or persuade the inmates, but instead cause an irreparable 
damage t[o] the lives of said people”). 
 166. See id. ¶¶ 143, 197(6), 205, 228(m); see also Laplante, Entwined Paths to 
Justice, supra note 158 (discussing how Peru sought to comply with international 
norms, beginning with the transitional government). 
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action “had a direct purpose: attack Sendero Luminoso.”167  
Moreover, the State added that this action was taken “from the 
government’s military strategy, towards this group, under the logic 
of an adversary war.”168 
In response, the Inter-American Court refers to Peru’s “context of 
systematic human rights violations, in which there were extrajudicial 
killings of people suspected of belonging to illegally armed groups, 
like Sendero Luminoso, and that said practices were realized by state 
agents following the orders of military and police leaders.”169 The 
court continues by recognizing that the right to life “plays a 
fundamental role in the American Convention since it is essential for 
realizing all other rights,” and that the State has both an affirmative 
and negative obligation to protect the “full and free exercise of the 
rights of all the people under its jurisdiction.”170 The court discussed 
the armed forces’ need to use restraint in keeping public order, 
balancing public security with the protection of fundamental human 
rights.171 The court thus found in favor of the petitioners, declaring 
that the State violated the fundamental rights of the victims. As such, 
the court ordered reparations for the survivors and families.172 In 
essence, the court rejected the Clean Hands Doctrine offered by the 
State as a defense.173 
Yet, the State offered a contradictory defense during the 
reparations phase of the hearing.  First, it expressed concern that it 
had already expended large sums of money to comply with past court 
judgments and friendly settlements made with the court.174  
Mentioning the unmanageability of the large class of victims 
 
 167. See Miguel Castro Castro Prison, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
160, ¶¶ 93, 230, 235. 
 168. See id. ¶ 235 [translation by author]. 
 169. See id. ¶¶ 93, 230, 235, 236 [translation by author]. 
 170. See id. ¶ 237 [translation by author]. 
 171. See id. ¶¶ 239-240. 
 172. See id. ¶¶ 179, 252, 424, 425 (ordering $10,000 in material damages for the 
families of each of the forty–one inmates killed and each survivor partially 
incapacitated, and $25,000 for each survivor fully incapacitated). 
 173. See id. ¶¶ 252, 258. 
 174. See id. ¶ 412(a) (noting that Peru had already spent $6,941,673.35 on 
individual judgments and $336,923.87 on friendly settlements issued by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, for victims of the internal armed 
conflict). 
LAPLANTE WITH AUTHOR CHANGES.DOC 1/9/2008  6:38:36 PM 
86 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [23:51 
contemplated in the case at issue, the State offered the possibility of 
instead approving a national law that would determine reparations 
“with criteria of equality and universality, without discrimination.”175 
In fact, the State appealed to the court to recognize “its intention to 
implement these policies and that will fix the order of reparations.”176 
The State’s solicitation came before the passage of the PIR law, and 
in retrospect presents an ironic foreshadowing of future problems for 
the politics of reparations in Peru.177 
F.  NATIONAL CONFLICT AND CONTROVERSY EMANATING FROM 
THE CASTRO CASTRO PRISON DECISION 
The reaction to the court’s decision in Castro Castro Prison has 
resulted in a national crisis, with some surprising and serious 
political developments that run contrary to the overall goal of the 
TRC to promote political transition and reconciliation. For instance, 
recently re-elected President Alan Garcia reacted to the court’s 
decision by saying it was “indignant that a court would reach a 
conclusion that would harm Peru, a victim of the insanity of a 
terrorist sect.”178  Prime Minister Jorge del Castillo publicly declared 
that “the judgment obligates us to pay terrorists with the money of 
Peruvians. The other day the daughter of a member of Sendero 
presented herself as innocent and deserving fifty thousand dollars 
because her father died. And who pays the innocents that her father 
killed?”179 As a reaction, the Peruvian Congress initiated criminal 
charges against former President Toledo for having accepted partial 
responsibility for the State’s actions at Castro Castro Prison, 
 
 175. See id. ¶ 412(b). 
 176. See id. ¶ 412(f) [translation by author]. 
 177. See Laplante & Theidon, Truth with Consequences, supra note 127, at 245-
46 (discussing the lack of funding, the slow pace, and the criticism of the 
reparations process in Peru). 
 178. See Marco Sánchez, Alan Garcia: “Pediremos a la CIDH Precisiones a su 
Sentencia” [Alan Garcia: “We Will Ask the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights for Clarifications on Its Sentence”], LA REPÚBLICA, Dec. 31, 2006, 
available at http://www.larepublica.com.pe/content/view/136949/483 [translation 
by author]. 
 179. See Del Castillo: “Se Obliga a Todos los Peruanos a Pagarles a 
Terroristas” [Del Castillo: “All Peruvians are Forced to Pay Terrorists”], LA 
REPÚBLICA, Jan. 12, 2007, available at http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/ 
option,com_contentant/task,view/id,138400/Itemid,0/ [translation by author]. 
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claiming he had thus failed to defend national interests as required by 
the National Constitution.180 With the preeminent concern relating to 
the actual payment from public coffers to “terrorists,” the State 
promoted the freezing of Fujimori’s assets to guarantee the payment 
of reparations.181 
In the meantime, the public campaign against the idea of terrorists 
receiving reparations continued through other means. Particularly, a 
faction of Peruvian newspapers known to be sponsored by ultra-right 
wing groups and militias sought to disrupt the political process 
spearheaded by the TRC.182 One of their targets became a memorial 
erected, and partially supported by a local municipality, for the 
victims of the internal armed conflict called El Ojo que Llora (the 
Eye that Cries) which the court in Castro Castro Prison calls “an 
important acknowledgment to the victims of the violence in Peru.”183 
Noting that only some of the names of prisoners were included in the 
monument, the court ordered that in one year’s time all names of the 
victims at Castro Castro Prison should be integrated into the 
monument.184 The press and certain public figures attacked the 
monument, threatening to demolish it, close it down, or at least 
remove names of the Castro Castro prisoners from the other 25,000 
 
 180. See Carolina Martín, Declaran Procedente Acusación Constitucional 
contra Toledo [Constitutional Accusations Against Toledo are Declared 
Appropriate], LA REPÚBLICA, Jan. 23, 2007, available at http://www.larepublica. 
com.pe/component/option,com_contentant/task,view/id,139872/Itemid,0/. 
 181. See César Romero, Juez Embarga Bienes de Fujimori por la Matanza de 
Castro Castro [Judge Seizes Fujimori’s Property for the Slaughter at Castro 
Castro], LA REPÚBLICA, Jan. 17, 2007, available at http://www.larepublica.com.pe 
/component/option,com_contentant/task,view/id,139047/Itemid,0/. 
 182. See Carlos Castro, El Retorno de los Bárbaros [The Return of the 
Barbarians], LA REPÚBLICA, Jan. 7, 2007,  available at http://www.larepublica. 
com.pe/component/option,com_contentant/task,view/id,137744/Itemid,0/. 
 183. Miguel Castro Castro Prison, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, 
¶ 454. 
 184. See id. (ordering Peru to allow the victims’ next of kin to include an 
inscription with the victim’s name on the monument); Lisa Laplante, Memory 
Dialogues and Symbolic Burials: Paths to Reconciliation in Peru, REFUGEE 
TRANSITIONS, Autumn 2007, available at http://www.startts.org.au/ 
default.aspx?id=330; see also Mary Turgi, Silent Crisis: Global Migration in the 
21st Century, 4 PERSPECTIVES 7 (2007) (describing El Ojo que Llora as a labyrinth 
formed by stones, each with the name of a victim, that forms a path to a large 
center rock that has a constant stream of water). 
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officially recognized victims.185  Because the memorial serves as an 
important mourning site for families who never found their loved 
ones, the inclusion of the Castro Castro Prison victims on the 
memorial provoked much public debate on which names deserve to 
be included in the public monument.186 
Meanwhile, some suggested that the government would seek to 
withdraw from the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, a claim later 
rebuked by Garcia under the pressure of a steady national and 
international campaign against this possibility.187 On the 18th and 
19th of January 2007, the State sent its State Attorney, Luis Alberto 
Salgado, to meet with representatives of the court to express its 
rejection of the Castro Castro Prison decision.188  Salgado expressed 
that “many of these victims were perpetrators, and also linked to 
Sendero Luminoso.”189 As a solution, the State offered to award these 
victims non-pecuniary reparations in health and education, as well as 
collective measures, presumably offering to integrate them into the 
PIR, to avoid the dilemma of paying reparations to suspected 
terrorists.190  In the turmoil of the controversy, the former president 
of the TRC went on record to comment that the current government 
“appears each day more like that of Fujimori,” suggesting that 
 
 185. See Romina Mella, No Es un Homenaje a los Terroristas [It is Not a 
Tribute to Terrorists], LA REPÚBLICA, Jan. 18, 2007, available at http://www. 
larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com_contentant/task,view/id,139194/Itemid,
0/. Before the TRC began its work, the state had estimated that the conflict left 
25,000 victims, based on names registered at with the Ombudsman’s office; these 
same names are those found on the stones in the Ojo que Llora monument. 
 186. See Romina Mella, Ocrospoma Pide Retirar las 41 Piedras [Ocrospoma 
Asks for the Removal of 41 Stones], LA REPÚBLICA, Jan. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1
39050&Itemid=0. 
 187. See Gobierno Niega Retiro de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos [The Government Denies Withdrawal from the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights], LA REPÚBLICA, Jan. 27, 2007, available at http://www.lare 
publica.com.pe/component/option,com_contentant/task,view/id,140535/Itemid,0/. 
 188. See Estado Plantea Indemnizar con Salud o Educación [The State 
Proposes Indemnifying with Health and Education], CORREO, Jan. 29, 2007, 
available at http://www.correoperu.com.pe/paginas_nota.php?nota_id=41820& 
seccion_nota=1 [translation by author]. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
LAPLANTE WITH AUTHOR CHANGES.DOC 1/9/2008  6:38:36 PM 
2007] THE LAW OF REMEDIES AND THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE 89 
current politics were running contrary to the goals of non-repetition 
promoted by the TRC.191 
CONCLUSION 
While experts continue to debate the Clean Hands Doctrine’s 
applicability in international law, national experiences like that of 
Peru reveal that its use in national reparations schemes presents 
serious legal and political issues. Indeed, we are left with important 
and pressing questions: In the aftermath of mass violence, especially 
conflict caused by civil strife between state agents and illegally 
armed groups, what are the criteria for repairing human rights 
violations?  Does international jurisprudence provide clear enough 
guidance on this issue? And even if it does, do political realities 
permit states to reject outright the Clean Hands Doctrine? 
Peru’s dilemma offers important opportunities for reflection and 
debate, especially given the ever increasing popularity of truth 
commissions. Indeed, as more national reparations plans arise, the 
issues generated by the Clean Hands Doctrine may have greater 
significance. Despite clear arguments against the adoption of the 
Clean Hands Doctrine in cases of human rights violations, practical 
political considerations may force states to nevertheless apply the 
principle. One wonders if the chance of widespread state adoption 
could be used to tip the debate in favor of adopting this equitable 
doctrine, which arguably still does not enjoy universal acceptance. 
At the same time, without clear consensus—and rejection of the 
Clean Hands Doctrine—a new tension may arise in the national-
international justice scheme. For instance, if international 
enforcement bodies like the Inter-American Court uphold the non-
discrimination principle in human rights protections, in direct 
contradiction to domestic administrative programs, it could produce 
two classes of beneficiaries with those “terrorists” excluded from 
national plans at times winning more generous reparations packages. 
What new national tensions would this situation create? There is 
always the risk that if an international decision proves to be too 
 
 191. See Juan Álvarez, Este Gobierno se Parece Cada Vez Más al de Fujimori 
[This Government Each Day Appears More and More Like that of Fujimori], LA 
REPÚBLICA, Jan. 15, 2007, available at http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/ 
option,com_contentant/task,view/id,138426/Itemid,0/. 
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polemic and risky in politically sensitive contexts, states like Peru 
may attempt to withdraw their consent to be subjected to 
international human rights systems, and thus leave citizens with less 
recourse to hold the state accountable.192 
The attempt to reconcile its international human rights obligations 
with its political situation merits close observation of Peru’s 
experience. Its struggle will inform the answers to some of the posed 
questions. One hopes that the international human rights system now 
enjoys enough strength to support civil society in its current local 
battle to make sure that all nationals enjoy their human rights, not 
only those who are believed to be innocent. 
 
 
 192. See, e.g., Natasha Parassram Concepcion, The Legal Implications of 
Trinidad & Tobago’s Withdrawal From the American Convention on Human 
Rights, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 847, 847 n.1, 849 nn.3-4 (2001) (analyzing 
Trinidad and Tobago’s decision to withdraw from international human rights treaty 
as a reflection of its society’s desire to deter violent crime). 
